

Secret

30 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Comments on Joint Study Group Recommendations

1. Re JSG recommendation #1a. All would depend on how this recommendation were executed. If for example all intelligence relating to Soviet anti-submarine warfare capabilities were made the exclusive responsibility of ONI (which is predisposed to believe that the Sovs can never lay a hand on the Polaris submarines); or if such responsibility for the Soviet anti-ICBM were made an exclusive with Air Force intelligence, the result would in our opinion not forward the national security. This sort of seemingly rational allocation of responsibility could constitute a truly grave peril point.

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2. Re JSG recommendation #1b2. We assume that in the circumstance the three (or four) service intelligence organizations still have separate entities. This recommendation is pure poison and for two reasons:

a. The coordinated substantive intelligence views (for views read "estimates" as they appear in the NIEs and SNIEs) of DOD would even more than at present contain the thrust of JCS policy. This surely would greatly damage what we hope to be the objective findings of national intelligence.

b. For a decade the most important estimates on Soviet weaponry, military policy, and strategy have brought into the open irreconcilable differences of opinion between service intelligence components. These differences are certain to persist. If a "coordinated DOD view" were permitted it would result either in formulations blurred to the point of uselessness or nonsense; or in the complete disregard of a dissenting service position. In this latter case the offended service would easily find the means of bootlegging its dissenting view to high echelons of government. The present scheme with the dissenter right out in the open and in print is a priceless ingredient of the NIE.

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3. Re JSG recommendation #30. This recommendation begins to make sense only if we assume that a single intelligence unit composed of present service components is put together in the DOD. Even in this case there are objections:

a. Who would it report to? If to the JCS, objections as above in our 2a would obtain. If to the Secretary of Defense, the military would be doing their intelligence business at one step removed and thru civilian channels.

b. In any case there would be no need to have both the Secretary of Defense and JCS represented on the USIB. The one who commanded the intelligence troops should be the only one represented.

If no gathering of service intelligence into a single organization is assumed the objections as above and for recommendation 1b2 hold (see our para 2a & b).

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National Estimates

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7. Recommendation that ELINT be placed more under the control of NSA.

We strongly favor this recommendation which is along the same line as that made by General Strong in his ELINT Survey of two years ago. The present decentralization of authority to field commands tends to make ELINT collection duplicative and wasteful and frequently directs the effort at targets of secondary importance from the point of view of national intelligence objectives. Further, there is need for tight technical control at the center in order that the material obtained on the tapes may be processed efficiently and effectively.

15. Assuring transmission of pertinent information to the National Indications Center.

This recommendation should be approved but you should note that the only action necessary is obedience to the Presidential Directive known as NSC 5438 of November 30, 1954, the key words of which are

"The President . . . hereby authorizes and directs all appropriate departments and agencies of the government:

"1. To make fully available to the Watch Committee of the USIB all information and intelligence of reasonable credibility pertinent to its mission and functions . . . without restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity."

No department or agency has a perfect record as far as compliance with this directive is concerned and a little jogging would do no harm, but there seems to be no need for a new basic directive.

16. **Recommendation for creation of a National Photo Intelligence Center.**

Revised draft NSCID 8 accompanies these notes in sufficient copies for you to distribute to the principals.

The main arguments for the creation of such a Center as a CIA Service of Common Concern, with Director to be appointed by you with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the USIB, include the following:

1. The present system has worked well on both TALENT and KEYHOLE missions. This proposal merely gives formal sanction to a proven arrangement which has been satisfactory to JCS, Department of Defense and other major intelligence consumers.
2. The military services' legitimate interests and needs for photo intelligence work in targeting, charting, etc. will remain unaffected.
3. The DCI, with his statutory and Presidential responsibility for intelligence affecting the national security, should have the prime responsibility for this critically important intelligence facility.
4. The Army and the Navy are already fully integrated in PIC and the Air Force has long had an open invitation to join. Conversely, the JCS and the Department of Defense have never integrated CIA in institutions under their control (NSA and WSEG).

5. The most experienced photo interpreters with the greatest continuity in the business are in CIA. They have enabled CIA to set the pace for the community in developing PI techniques and in research and development on advanced equipment. (Note SAC's extensive procurement of CIA-developed instruments.)

6. Though photography should be scanned rapidly and thoroughly for indications of hostile intentions, it cannot be counted on as a major source of early warning because of cloud cover, random timing, etc. It is therefore not to be equated with radar systems and other elements of the Defense early warning complex. What is derived is largely evidence of enemy capabilities -- military, industrial, and logistic.

7. Concentrated study and exploitation by highly trained personnel using expensive equipment is necessary to derive key answers to intelligence questions from this material. A facility manned jointly by experts from the intelligence community as a whole gives best hope of continued success.